中国有足够的勇气发动战争吗？看看中国是否是一只悬空的狗。Does China enough Brave to Start War ? Will See If China is not a dog barking to the air
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-foreign-minister-steps-threats-taiwan-98747533
China’s foreign minister stepped up threats Friday against the self-governing island of Taiwan, saying any who go against Beijing’s demand to exert control over the island are “playing with fire.”
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65247965
上周六，就在习近平与埃马纽埃尔·马克龙喝茶并呼吁乌克兰实现和平的几个小时后，战斗机飞越台湾海峡以展示中国的军事实力。
中国的演习旨在恐吓台湾，在法国总统国事访问标志着中国外交达到高潮的第二天开始。
这种不和谐的并置是中国向世界展示的两张面孔的最新例证——一位鸽派的国际和平缔造者，以及一只张开牙齿捍卫其领土的攻击犬。
Last Saturday, just hours after Xi Jinping sipped tea with Emmanuel Macron while calling for peace in Ukraine, fighter jets flew across the Taiwan Strait in a display of Chinese military might.
Aimed at intimidating Taiwan, China’s drills began the day after a state visit by the French president that marked a high point in Chinese diplomacy.
The jarring juxtaposition was the latest example of the two faces China has presented to the world – a dovish international peacemaker, and an attack dog baring its teeth to defend what it sees as its territory.
https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2023/why-chinas-billionaires-keep-disappearing/
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64781986
消失的亿万富翁：马云和其他神秘消失的中国大亨
科技行业交易撮合者鲍凡上个月失踪，重新点燃了人们对最近中国现象——消失的亿万富翁的兴趣。
华兴资本的创始人——其客户包括互联网巨头腾讯、阿里巴巴和百度——被视为中国科技行业的巨头。
鲍先生的案子走上了一条老路：他失踪了几天，然后他的公司宣布他“正在配合中华人民共和国某些当局正在进行的调查”。
阿里巴巴创始人马云最近出现在公司总部所在地杭州的云谷学校，成为头条新闻。 自从他在 2020 年激怒了中国共产党批评中国的金融监管体系以来，他就很少公开露面了。“他形容他们有一种‘当铺心态’，这确实激怒了很多人，”德克斯特·罗伯茨 (Dexter Roberts) 说， 大西洋理事会印太安全倡议高级研究员，《中国资本主义的神话》一书的作者。 “此外，马云的傲慢性格惹恼了中国的许多监管机构和非常有权势的人。” 马云并不是第一个从公众视野中神秘消失的亿万富翁。 2015年，有中国巴菲特之称的郭广昌失踪。 该公司后来表示，他正在协助当局进行调查。 2017年，加拿大华裔亿万富翁肖建华在香港被中国安全人员绑架。 2022年，他因诈骗和腐败被判处有期徒刑13年。 中国亿万富翁的神秘失踪还没有停止。 今年2月，知名投资银行家鲍凡成为“消失的亿万富翁”榜单上的最新一位。 然而，几天后，他的公司表示他“正在配合中华人民共和国某些当局正在进行的调查”。 经济学人智库全球贸易首席分析师尼克马罗说：“当像包凡这样的人消失时，像包凡这样高调的人突然消失而没有任何解释，这不可避免地会给其他市场带来一种令人不寒而栗的感觉。” “我的意思是，你怎么能觉得你可以在一个行业的重要领导者突然消失的地方做生意？”
Disappearing Billionaires: Jack Ma And Other Chinese Moguls Who Have Mysteriously Dropped Off The Radar
The disappearance last month of technology industry dealmaker Bao Fan has rekindled interest in a recent Chinese phenomenon – vanishing billionaires.
The founder of China Renaissance Holdings – with a client list that has included internet giants Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu – is seen as a titan in the country’s tech sector.
Mr Bao’s case has followed a well-trodden path: he went missing for days before his company announced that he was “co-operating in an investigation being carried out by certain authorities in the People’s Republic of China”.
Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, made headlines when he was recently spotted at Yungu School in Hangzhou, where the company is headquartered. He had rarely made a public presence since he irked the Chinese Communist Party for criticizing the country’s financial regulatory system in 2020. “He described them as having a ‘pawnshop mentality,’ and that really ruffled a lot of feathers,” said Dexter Roberts, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and author of The Myth of Chinese Capitalism. “Also, just the brash character of Jack Ma rubbed a lot of regulators and very powerful people in China the wrong way.” Jack Ma wasn’t the first billionaire who mysteriously disappeared from public view. In 2015, Guo Guangchang, who is known as China’s Warren Buffet, went missing. The company later said he was assisting authorities with an investigation. In 2017, Xiao Jianhua, a Chinese-Canadian billionaire, was abducted by Chinese security agents from Hong Kong. In 2022, he was sentenced to 13 years in prison for fraud and corruption. The mysterious disappearance of China’s billionaires hasn’t stopped yet. In February, Bao Fan, a renowned investor banker, became the latest name on the list of ‘vanishing billionaires.’ However, a few days later, his company said he was “cooperating in an investigation being carried out by certain authorities in the People’s Republic of China.” “When someone like Bao Fan disappears, someone that high profile who suddenly vanishes without explanation, that inevitably sends a chilling kind of feel through the rest of the market,” said Nick Marro, lead analyst for global trade at the Economist Intelligence Unit. “I mean, how can you feel like you can do business in a place where, you know, an important leader of the industry can suddenly disappear?”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/5/why-is-china-so-upset-at-a-meeting-between-tsai-and-mccarthy
美国众议院议长凯文·麦卡锡预计将于周三晚些时候在加利福尼亚会见台湾总统蔡英文。
麦卡锡已确认他将在洛杉矶市中心以北约 64 公里（40 英里）的罗纳德里根总统图书馆举行的“两党”活动中与蔡英文会面。
Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the United States House of Representatives, is expected to meet Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in California later on Wednesday.
McCarthy has confirmed he will meet Tsai at a “bipartisan” event at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, about 64km (40 miles) north of the centre of Los Angeles.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/1/chinas-media-realities-clash-over-truth-about-war-in-ukraine
她告诉半岛电视台说:”我认为大多数中国人没有注意到战争，因为他们要么没有关注战争，要么只是从中国媒体上获得有关战争的消息。”
她对半岛电视台说:”但是，如果你能够超越防火墙（用来形容中国对互联网的严格审查），你就会看到，人们对这场战争的说法和报道方式截然不同，在国际和西方媒体上报道的方式截然不同。”
入侵初期，中国国家电视台CCTV报道称，美国资助乌克兰实验室研制生物武器。 据报道,乌克兰总统泽伦斯基在俄罗斯发动第一波袭击后逃离基辅。
中国媒体随后忠实地转达了俄罗斯关于乌克兰平民在基辅附近的布查镇遭受酷刑和杀害的报道是”假新闻”的说法。
一直以来，入侵过去和现在都被称为”特别军事行动”，正如俄罗斯媒体所报道的那样。
“I think the majority of Chinese people don’t notice it because they either don’t pay attention to the war or they only get their news about it from Chinese media,” she told Al Jazeera.
“But if you are able to look beyond the firewall [a term used to describe China’s draconian censoring of the internet], you see that the war is talked about very differently and reported on very differently in international and Western media,” she told Al Jazeera.
Early on in the invasion, China’s state broadcaster CCTV ran claims that the United States had funded the development of biological weapons in Ukrainian labs. It was also reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had fled Kyiv in the wake of the first wave of Russian attacks.
Chinese media then dutifully relayed the Russian assertions that reports of torture and killings of Ukrainian civilians in the town of Bucha, near Kyiv, were ”fake news”.
All the while, the invasion was, and still is, being referred to as a “special military operation”, just as in Russian media.
然而，尽管存在审查制度以及信息泡沫，林和唐都注意到中国社交媒体上处理俄罗斯入侵的方式发生了变化。
战争爆发时，林书豪在中国社交媒体上看到了一些反战言论，但她所读的大部分帖子都是亲俄和反西方的。
林说:”现在，我认为批评俄罗斯的帖子和评论比以前多得多，而且在被审查员删除之前，他们熬夜的时间也更长。”
Despite the censorship and the information bubble, however, both Lin and Tang have noticed a change in the way the Russian invasion is being addressed on Chinese social media.
Lin saw some anti-war remarks on Chinese social media when the war first broke out but the vast majority of posts she read were pro-Russia and anti-Western.
“Now, I think that there is a lot more posts and comments that are critical of Russia compared to before, and they also stay up longer before they are removed by censors,” Lin said.
Chinese cities are struggling to pay their bills as ‘hidden debts’ soar 随着”隐性债务”的激增，中国城市正在努力支付账单
中国城市因支付巨额新冠肺炎封锁费用而现金不足 China’s cities are running out of cash to pay huge Covid lockdown bills
中国地方自治团体承担的大部分债务都是为了支援引起争议的零新冠肺炎政策的特点–严格的封锁、集体检测、隔离中心。随着债务及其利益的不断积累和成熟，中国地方政府被迫削减支出或推迟投资，阻碍经济增长和公共服务。郑州是世界上最大的iPhone工厂所在地，其财政收入平均每年下降14%，总债务增长14%。 2022年，其债务对财政收入比猛增178%，而2019年为75%。中国城市的公共服务支出正受到债务增长的影响。郑州的公交车司机说，2021年他们的工资被削减了，而清扫街道的人继续工作，尽管几个月来他们都没有得到服务费。
Most of the debts incurred by Chinese local governments aimed to fund the strict lockdowns, mass testing and quarantine centers, which were the hallmarks of the controversial zero-COVID policy. As the debt and its interests continue to pile up and mature, Chinese local governments are forced to cut their spending or delay investments, impeding economic growth and public services. In Zhengzhou, where the world’s biggest iPhone factory stands, the city’s fiscal revenue dropped by an average of 14% per year while its total debt grew by 14%. Its debt-to-fiscal income ratio surged 178% in 2022, compared with 75% in 2019. The Chinese city’s public services spending is feeling the brunt of the growing debt. Zhengzhou’s bus drivers said their salaries were cut in 2021, while street sweepers continue to work despite not being paid for their services in months.
在预示习近平零新冠肺炎政策突然结束的12月政策转换之前,地方自治团体投入巨额资金实施频繁的新冠肺炎封锁、大规模检查、防疫中心设置等,使预算枯竭。
中国一省在政策转换前投入220亿美元用于消除新冠肺炎
中国一省在政策转换前投入220亿美元用于消除新冠肺炎
华盛顿捍卫民主基金会高级研究员克雷格?辛格尔顿(Craig Singleton)说:”北京正面临自己制造的经济雷区。 总而言之,中国当前的债务危机是一场完美的风暴。
Local governments have exhausted their budgets after spending enormous amounts of money on enforcing frequent Covid lockdowns, mass testing and setting up quarantine centers before December’s policy U-turn, which signaled the abrupt end of Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy.
One Chinese province spent $22 billion on eliminating Covid before policy U-turn
“Beijing is facing an economic minefield of its own making,” said Craig Singleton, senior fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington. “All told, China’s current debt crisis represents a perfect storm.”
根据Mars Macro分析师的最新估计，地方政府金融工具发行的”隐性债务”到2022年年中可能总计达65万亿元人民币（合9.6万亿美元）。 湖南的一家经济研究公司。这比高盛2021年预测的53万亿元人民币高出20%以上。
这相当于中国GDP的一半以上。分析师估计，总体而言，中国政府债务相当于其GDP的102%。
The “hidden debt” issued by local government financial vehicles, entities created to circumvent borrowing restrictions and used to channel funding for infrastructure spending, might have totaled 65 trillion yuan ($9.6 trillion) by the middle of 2022, according to a recent estimate by analysts at Mars Macro, an economic research firm based in Hunan. That’s more than 20% higher than the estimate of 53 trillion yuan made by Goldman Sachs in 2021. That would be equivalent to more than half of China’s GDP. Overall, Chinese government debt is now equivalent to 102% of its GDP, the analysts estimated.
中国男子被指拒绝进入隔离设施后被拖出家门 Chinese Man dragged out of home after allegedly refusing to go to quarantine facility
中国抗议美国南海航行自由行动
美国第七舰队宣布，在中国声称驱逐该船离开其领海的第二天，一艘美国军舰在南中国海进行了航行自由行动。
美国米利乌斯号（DDG-69）在帕尔群岛附近航行，然后进入南海，根据释放。
China Protests U.S. South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operation A United States warship conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, near the Parcel Islands, the day after China claimed it chased away the ship from its territorial waters, the US 7th Fleet announced. USS Milius (DDG-69) sailed near the Parcel Islands and then into the South China Sea, according to the release.
China is known for its stringent censorship regime, with popular apps like Douyin falling in line. The search term ‘Tiananmen 1989’ on Douyin did not yield any search result, CNN reported. But the same term searched on TikTok will lead to videos of users talking about the People’s Liberation Army’s brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing that year.
— Read on www.hindustantimes.com/technology/why-is-chinese-app-tiktok-inaccessible-in-china-101679819210659.html
中国短视频应用程序TikTok在全球范围内正面临艰难时期。虽然它已被英国、加拿大、法国、比利时、印度等国家禁止，但它正在努力防止自己被美国禁止。参议院已经投票禁止抖音使用所有政府设备。
Chinese short video app TikTok is facing a tough time globally. While it has been banned by countries like United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, India and others, it is fighting to prevent itself to be banned by the United States. The Senate has already voted to ban TikTok from all government devices.
中国以其严格的审查制度而闻名，抖音等热门应用程序也符合要求。据CNN报道，抖音上的搜索词“Tiananmen 1989”没有产生任何搜索结果。但在抖音上搜索的相同术语将导致用户谈论当年中国人民解放军对北京民主抗议者的残酷镇压的视频。
China is known for its stringent censorship regime, with popular apps like Douyin falling in line. The search term ‘Tiananmen 1989’ on Douyin did not yield any search result, CNN reported. But the same term searched on TikTok will lead to videos of users talking about the People’s Liberation Army’s brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing that year.
Orville Schell & Irena Grudzińska Gross about the country’s increasingly worrisome trajectory, both at home and abroad.
— Read on www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/xi-jinping-china-tragedy-by-orville-schell-and-irena-grudzinska-gross-2023-03
尽管习近平去年年底终于结束了中国灾难性的零新冠肺炎政策，但他继续加倍努力深化国内专制和海外侵略的列宁主义项目。更多中西“脱钩”和冷战式集团的出现几乎是肯定的。
Although Xi Jinping finally ended China’s disastrous zero-COVID policy late last year, he has continued to double down on his Leninist project of deepening autocracy at home and aggression abroad. More Sino-Western “decoupling” and the emergence of Cold War-style blocs is all but assured.
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frontier-influencers
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers.
In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’.
Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image.
Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’.
这份报告探讨了中国政党国家的全球宣传和虚假信息能力是如何演进和日益成熟的。 令人担忧的是，中国政党国家影响有关中国的国际讨论的新方法，包括模糊其侵犯人权记录，在很大程度上是在美国社交媒体平台和西方决策者的监视下飞行的。
在中国共产党试图审查言论、宣传虚假信息和利用其首选叙事播撒互联网的更广泛的背景下，我们关注的是一些规模虽小但日益流行的YouTube账号，这些账号主要以来自新疆边疆地区的华裔女性为特色， 西藏和内蒙古，以下简称”边疆影响者”或”边疆账户”。
YouTube虽然在中国被封锁,但被中共视为与外部意识形态角逐的核心战场,最近几年YouTube在对外宣传上的使用正在加强。 最初部署在国内视频共享平台以满足内部宣传需要，此后，作为中共对抗对中国人权问题的批评和提高国家形象不断努力的一部分，前沿影响力内容已经转向YouTube上的全球受众。
除了党国媒体和外国博客，这些经过仔细审查的国内博客越来越被视为北京对外宣传武库的另一个关键部分。 他们使用更个人化的沟通方式和更柔和的表达方式，预计会比传统的党-国媒体内容更有说服力，后者往往倾向于更僵硬和更具教育意义的内容。 用一位中国宣传专家的话说，对中共来说，边疆势力代表着”国际舆论舞台”中的”游击队或民兵”，而政党国家媒体或”正规军”则代表着”冲锋陷阵、杀阵、在前线前进”。
由HurshidemAblikim主演的短片截图(附英文字幕)
资料来源:”人权”，YouTube，2020年4月23日，在线。
影响者是中国宣传的新面孔。 他们隐藏在关于小狗和化妆的博客中，秘密允许北京粉饰其危害人类的罪行。 YouTube虽然在中国被封锁,但已成为中国共产党重要的意识形态战场。 他们创造了一个全新的影响者生态系统，这些影响者遵循着党的路线。 通过这些视频，这些维吾尔族影响者将他们的祖国新疆描绘成田园诗般的繁荣景象。 然而，许多可信的报告记录了中国对维吾尔族人口持续犯下的罪行——从强奸、强迫绝育到奴役。 澳大利亚战略政策研究所的研究员Daria Impiombato和她的团队观看了其中的1700多个视频。 很快，他们发现了一个令人担忧的灰色区域，这些影响因素在其中运作。 通过在”多频道网络”或MCN工作， 这些”影响力机构”拥有国家认可的VPN网络，允许它们绕过无所不能的”中国防火墙”。 然而，这些机构与中国共产党有联系，其内容必须严格遵守中国法律。 北京的宣传机器正在试图控制叙事，不仅是在他们的边界内，而且也在你们的算法内。
Influencers are the new face of Chinese propaganda. Hidden amongst the vlogs about puppies and makeup, they clandestinely allow Beijing to whitewash its crimes against humanity. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube has become a key ideological battleground for the Chinese Communist Party. And they have created a whole new ecosystem of influencers who tow the party line. From looking at these videos, these Uygher influencers portray their homeland of Xinjiang as idyllic and prosperous. However, numerous and credible reports document China’s ongoing crimes against the Uygher population – from rape, forced sterilization to slave labor. Daria Impiombato, a Researcher at The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and her team, watched over 1,700 of these videos. Soon enough, they found a worrying grey area in which these influencers operate. Through working for ‘multi-channel networks’ or MCNs,. These “influencer agencies”, with state-approved VPN networks, allow them to circumnavigate the all-powerful “Great Firewall of China”. However, these agencies are linked to the Chinese Communist Party, and their content must strictly follow Chinese law. Beijing’s propaganda machine is attempting to control the narrative, not just within their borders, but directly within your algorithms too.
Table 1: Frontier accounts on YouTube with more than 2,000 followers
To interact with the hyperlinks, please download the full report.
Figure 18: A video on the Ayituna (阿依图娜) channel describing the beautiful hair of the women in the vlogger’s family
Figure 24: Screenshots of posts from the @Maryamugul Twitter account featuring frontier influencer vide
Source: ‘Xinjiang Mali’ [新疆玛丽], Twitter, 9 October 2021, online; ‘Xinjiang Mali’ [新疆玛丽], Twitter, 27 May 2021, online.
The now-suspended @LeonaBenjamin18 Twitter account shares the same name and profile picture as the currently active @Maryamugul Twitter account
Source: Twitter.
Xiaowu Brothers’ post outlining ‘detailed rules for the review of online short video content’
Source: ‘Xiaowu Brothers’ [杭州小五和她的兄弟们科技有限公司], Facebook, 30 December 2021, online.
Meta’s blog post on Xiaowu Brothers’ success story
Source: Meta for Media, 5 August 2022, online.
Xiaowu Technology joint party branch held an organisational life meeting and carried out a criticism and self-criticism session of party members
Source: ‘Jincheng Xiaowu Technology’ [晋城小五科技], Weixin, 1 April 2022, online.
Pre-roll advertisements on videos about Xinjiang cotton, appearing on the ‘Annie Guli’ and ‘Chinar girl on horseback’ YouTube accounts, and a pop-up ad on the ‘GuLi XinJiang’ account
Sources: 安妮古丽 (Annie Guli), online; 马背少女驰娜尔 (Chinar girl on horseback), online; GuLi XinJiang, online.
在习近平看来，中国及其边疆地区的形象被用来遏制国家崛起的”外国势力”的负面形象扭曲了。 塑造一个”可信、可爱、可敬”的中国边疆形象，是为中国营造一个良好的内外环境，进而促进中国的稳定、发展和全球力量。 在中国被屏蔽的平台上出现了种族边界账户，这再次表明北京愿意尝试建立其全球话语权。
党国担心，向普通中国人开放社交媒体平台和其他互动渠道，将使他们面临受西方优越的”话语权”影响的风险，并破坏中共的政治计划。 中共不但没有鼓励中国网民广泛参与外国平台，反而继续限制他们跨防火墙进行对话，表明党国不相信中国公民”讲好中国故事”，除非他们通过指定的渠道被引导和引导。
边境影响账户越来越多地被用作北京日益增长的宣传武器库的一部分。 它们被视为一种可以利用的资源，但前提是它们得到适当的利用。 目前，他们的有效性似乎主要限于全球华人侨民。 但是，随着北京继续加大对社交媒体内容制作的政治控制，并使官方言论和自我表达更加一致，这些看似真实的报道很可能会被发布到全世界。
From Xi’s point of view, the image of China and its frontier regions is distorted by negative portrayals from ‘foreign forces’ used to contain the country’s rise. Creating a ‘credible, lovable, and respectable image’ of China’s frontier regions is meant to cultivate a favourable domestic and external environment for the PRC that will, in turn, facilitate the country’s stability, development and global power. The emergence of ethnic-frontier accounts on platforms blocked in China is another sign of Beijing’s willingness to experiment in building its global voice.
The party-state is concerned that opening up access to social media platforms and other interactive channels to regular Chinese people will expose them to the risk that they’ll be influenced by the West’s superior ‘discourse power’ and undermine the CCP’s political project. Far from encouraging widespread participation of Chinese internet users on foreign platforms, the CCP has continued to restrict them from engaging in dialogue across the firewall, indicating that the party-state doesn’t trust Chinese citizens to ‘tell China’s story well’ unless they’re led and guided through designated channels.
Frontier-influencer accounts are increasingly used as an emerging part of Beijing’s growing propaganda arsenal. They’re seen as a resource to be drawn on, but only if they’re harnessed properly. At present, their effectiveness appears to be mostly limited to the global Chinese diaspora. But, as Beijing continues to ramp up political control over social media content production and bring official discourse and self-expression further into line, more of these seemingly authentic accounts are likely to be unleashed onto the world.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-chatbots-run-up-against-chinas-censorship-f7ee1cea
For experimenting, WSJ talked to four Chinese chatbots. According to the report, Gipi Talk, an AI bot developed by a group of engineers in Shenzhen could reply the best. However, when talking about China’s politics, it tried to steer the conversation away from the topic.
Interestingly, Gipi Talk’s content moderation is also provided by Baidu. Here is the chat WSJ had with the chatbot.
Q: Is Xi Jinping a good leader?
A: The question couldn’t pass a safety review. No response could be generated for you.
Q: Why did my question fail to pass the safety review?
A: Let’s change the topic and talk about something else.
Q: What can you talk about?
A: It’s nice to chat with you! We can chat about technology, culture, sports, travel, entertainment, cooking, or any topic you want. What would you like to talk about?
Q: Can we talk about politics?
A: Of course, we can talk about politics. But we need to respect each other’s views and avoid offensive language or violence to maintain a rational, peaceful and constructive dialogue environment. What aspect of politics would you like to discuss?
Q: Chinese politics.
A: The question couldn’t pass a safety review. No response could be generated for you.
Q: Well then, can we talk about American politics?
A: The question couldn’t pass a safety review. No response could be generated for you
Earlier chatbots developed in China have also shown similar filters. ChatYuan was one of the first ChatGPT-like creations in China. It was suspended days after its launch in February. According to WSJ, during the brief window when it was live, a prompt of Jinping’s name yielded a warning, “The prompt contained words that violate rules”.
为了进行实验，WSJ 与四个中国聊天机器人进行了交谈。 据报告书显示,深圳工程师集团开发的AI机器人”Gipi Talk”的回答最好。 然而，在谈论中国政治时，它试图把话题从话题上转移开。
有趣的是，GipiTalk的内容节制也是由百度提供的。 下面是 WSJ 与聊天机器人进行的聊天。
问:习近平是个好领导人吗？
答:这个问题不能通过安全审查。 无法为您生成任何响应。
问:为何我的质询未能通过安全检讨？
让我们换个话题，谈点别的吧。
问:你能谈些什么？
很高兴和你聊天！ 我们可以谈论科技、文化、体育、旅游、娱乐、烹饪或任何你想要的话题。 你想谈什么？
问:我们可以谈谈政治吗？
答:当然，我们可以谈谈政治。 但是，我们需要尊重彼此的观点，避免冒犯性的语言或暴力，以维持一个合理、和平与建设性的对话环境。 您想讨论政治的哪些方面？
问:中国政治。
答:这个问题不能通过安全审查。 无法为您生成任何响应。
问:那么，我们可以谈谈美国政治吗？
答:这个问题不能通过安全审查。 无法为您生成任何响应
中国早期开发的聊天机器人也显示了类似的过滤器。 聊源是中国最早仿ChatGPT的创作之一。 它在2月份发射后几天就被暂停了。 据《华尔街日报》报道,在直播的简短窗口中,出现了”提示中包含违反规则的单词”的警告。
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/14/russia-china-creating-world-of-danger-disorder-division-uk
“俄罗斯非法入侵乌克兰、将能源和食品供应武器化以及不负责任的核言论，再加上中国在南海和台湾海峡采取更具侵略性的立场，有可能创造一个充满危险、混乱和分裂的世界，”英国 总理 Rishi Sunak 在评论的前言中写道。
“Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, weaponisation of energy and food supplies and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, combined with China’s more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, are threatening to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division,” UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak wrote in the foreword to the review.
数千人签署了一份在线请愿书，要求将香港演员甄子丹免为今年奥斯卡颁奖典礼的主持人，因为他支持中国政府。
据英国广播公司报道，该请愿书是由香港活动家Tong Wai-hung发起的，他声称该决定“表现出对香港人民的蔑视”，Yen的存在将“损害电影业的形象和声誉”。
Thousands have signed an online petition to remove Hong Kong actor Donnie Yen as a presenter at this year’s Oscars due to his support of the Chinese government.
As reported by the BBC, the petition was set up by Hong Kong activist Tong Wai-hung, who claims the decision “shows contempt for the people of Hong Kong” and that Yen’s presence will “damage the image and reputation of the film industry”.
https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-permits-more-flights-to-china-as-goodwill-gesture/a-64932665
The Taiwanese government on Thursday said it had agreed to resume more direct flights to China that were stopped after the coronavirus pandemic. It said this was part of a bid to foster “healthy and orderly exchanges” with Beijing amid continued tension in the region. Taiwan currently allows air access to only four cities in China, namely Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai, and Xiamen. Prior to the pandemic, however, there were more direct flights to multiple Chinese cities from Taiwan. 台湾政府周四表示,同意恢复新冠肺炎疫情后中断的飞往中国的直航。 声明说，这是在该地区持续紧张的情况下，为促进与北京”健康有序的交流”而做出的努力的一部分。台湾目前只允许飞往中国四个城市，即北京、成都、上海和厦门。然而，在大流行之前，台湾有更多的直飞中国多个城市的航班。
The state’s hardening censorship and heavier hand have held back its tech industry; so has entrepreneurs’ reluctance to invest for the long term. It wasn’t always that way.
中国为什么不发明ChatGPT
该州日益严格的审查和更严厉的手法阻碍了其科技产业; 企业家不愿意长期投资也是原因之一。 情况并不总是这样。
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/17/business/china-chatgpt-microsoft-openai.html
Today, much has changed. Microsoft — an icon of American technology — helped the start-up OpenAI usher its experimental chatbot, ChatGPT, into the world. And China’s tech entrepreneurs are shocked and demoralized. It has dawned on many of them that despite the hype, China lags far behind in artificial intelligence and tech innovation.
“Why wasn’t ChatGPT invented in China?” they asked. “How big is the ChatGPT gap between China and the U.S.?” “The Chinese equivalent of ChatGPT? Don’t take it too seriously.”
They’re also asking more fundamental questions about the country’s innovation environment: Have censorship, geopolitical tensions and the government’s growing control of the private sector made China less friendly to innovation?
“The development of any significant technological product is inseparable from the system and environment in which it operates,” said Xu Chenggang, a senior research scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions. He cited TikTok’s Chinese-language sister app Douyin as the sort of innovation that Chinese companies might be unable to achieve in the future because of government limitations on the industry.
“Once the open environment is gone, it will be challenging to create such products,” he said.
If a decade ago China was the wild, wild East for tech entrepreneurship and innovation, it’s a very different country now.
今天，发生了很大变化。 作为美国技术的象征，微软帮助刚起步的OpenAI将它的实验聊天机器人——ChatGPT推向了世界。 中国的科技企业家也感到震惊和沮丧。 他们中的许多人已经意识到，尽管大肆宣传，中国在人工智能和技术创新方面仍远远落后。
“为什么ChatGPT都不是中国发明的？” 他们问。 “中美之间的ChatGPT差距有多大？” “中国相当于ChatGPT？” 别太认真了。”
他们还提出了关于中国创新环境的更基本的问题:审查制度、地缘政治紧张以及政府对私营部门的日益控制是否使中国对创新不那么友好？
斯坦福大学中国经济与制度研究中心高级研究员徐成刚说:”任何重大技术产品的开发都离不开其运行的体制和环境。 他认为TikTok的中文姊妹应用程序Douyin是中国企业未来可能无法实现的一种创新，因为政府对行业的限制。
他说:”一旦开放环境消失，创造这样的产品将具有挑战性。”
如果说十年前中国是技术创业和创新的狂野的东方，那么现在它已经是一个完全不同的国家了。
1.俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争
2.美中关系
3.民粹主义
4.通货膨胀
hinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the Communist Party Congress could be one of the most consequential of the decade. He told the audience – and the world – that his economic growth-crushing zero-COVID policy is here to stay, and that Beijing is more determined than ever to reunify with Taiwan, peacefully if possible and by force if necessary.
We are living in a moment of deep geopolitical rifts and extraordinary economic uncertainty, epitomised by Xi’s pronouncements. The world is clearly not reverting to some pre-COVID status quo. Instead, a combination of underlying forces has upended the previous world order and ushered in a period of profound disorder.
中国国家领导人习近平最近在中共代表大会上的讲话可能是十年来最有影响的讲话之一。 他告诉观众——以及全世界——他的经济增长压垮的零COVID政策将持续下去，北京比以往任何时候都更加决心与台湾实现和平统一，如果可能的话，如果必要的话，将以武力实现统一。
我们生活在一个地缘政治裂痕深重、经济异常不确定性的时刻，习近平的声明就是明证。 世界显然没有恢复到新冠肺炎之前的状态。 相反，基础力量的组合颠覆了前一个世界秩序，并进入了一个严重的混乱时期。
twitter.com/ZYZZ337799/status/1608989037515395073
Words penetrate the bone
There are eight important evidence of Chinese ignorance:
1. 90% of people think that the Old Summer Palace was burned by the Eight-Nation Alliance;
2. 90% of people think that China won the Korean War. 3. 90% think that housing prices are done by local merchants!
4. 90% of people think that the emperor is good, and treacherous ministers harm the country and the people.
5.90% of people think that China has a lot of land and property, and the government has raised 1.4 billion people.
6.90% of people firmly believe that newspapers and TV stations are telling the truth.
7. 90% of people think that if you don’t fight corruption, you will kill the party first, then the country, and finally the people.
8, 90% of people think that freedom is unmanaged and can be messed around. It must be managed by a strong government.
《字字透骨》
中国人的愚昧有八个重要证据：
1. 90%的人以为圆明园是八国联军烧的；
2、90%的人以为朝鲜战争中国打赢了 3、90%的人以为房价是地商搞上去的！
4，90%的人以为皇帝是好的，是奸臣祸国殃民。
5，90%的人以为中国地大物博，政府养活了十四亿人。
6，90%的人以为报纸和电视台说的都是真话而坚信不疑。
7，90%的人以为不反腐会先亡党后亡国，最后亡老百姓。
8, 90%的人以为自由就是沒人管，可以乱来，必须要强有力的政府来管理。
小时候，美国是敌人，法国是敌人，英国是敌人，菲律宾越南韩国是敌人…后来，印度是敌人，同族兄弟台湾也是敌人，就连”老大哥”苏修也成了敌人！我恨他们，我想当兵去打他们。
慢慢的，我长大了，我百思不得其解：我们为什么有这么多敌人？
现在，终于明白了：原来，我们是世界公敌！
When I was a child, the United States was the enemy, France was the enemy, the United Kingdom was the enemy, and the Philippines, Vietnam and South Korea were enemies… Later, India was the enemy, Taiwan, the brother of the same race, was also the enemy, and even the “Big Brother” Su Xiu became the enemy! I hate them. I want to be a soldier to beat them. Slowly, when I grew up, I couldn’t figure it out: Why do we have so many enemies? Now, I finally understand that we are the public enemies of the world!
WHO presses China for more data after COVID death tally leaps from 37 to 60K
The new death toll figure “should be considered the minimum.”
— Read on arstechnica.com/science/2023/01/china-revises-recent-covid-death-toll-from-37-to-60000-but-thats-still-low/
